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Abstract
We provide two new characterizations of exact games. First, a
game is exact if and only if it is exactly balanced; and second, a game
is exact if and only if it is totally balanced and overbalanced.
The condition of exact balancedness is identical to the one of bal-
ancedness, except that one of the balancing weights may be negative
while for overbalancedness one of the balancing weights is required to
be non-positive and no weight is put on the grand coalition. Exact
balancedness and overbalancedness are both easy to formulate condi-
tions with a natural game-theoretic interpretation and are shown to
be useful in applications.
Using exact balancedness we show that exact games are convex for
the grand coalition and that the classes of convex and totally exact
games coincide. We provide an example of a game that is totally
balanced and convex for the grand coalition, but not exact. Finally
we relate classes of balanced, totally balanced, convex for the grand
coalition, exact, totally exact, and convex games to one another.
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1 Introduction
It is well-known that the core in a transferable utility game is non-empty if
and only if the game is balanced (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967). The core
of every subgame of a transferable utility game is non-empty if and only if the
game is totally balanced. Totally balanced games arise from a wide range of
applications. They coincide with market games (Shapley and Shubik, 1969);
also with a special case of market games with a continuum of indivisible
commodities: cooperation in fair division (Legut, 1990); they are equivalent
to a class of maximum flow problems (Kalai and Zemel, 1982a); and also
to permutation games of less than four players (Tijs, Parthasarathy, Potters,
and Prassad, 1984). Moreover, totally balanced games are generated by linear
production games (Owen, 1975), generalized network problems (Kalai and
Zemel, 1982b), and controlled mathematical programming problems (Dubey
and Shapley, 1984).
In this paper we provide a set of linear programming problems to study a
subclass of totally balanced games, exact games (Schmeidler, 1972). By the
linear programming problems one can easily check whether a game is exact
or not. Using the dual of the linear programming problems we develop two
new characterizations of exact games. These characterizations complement
earlier characterizations by Schmeidler (1972) and Azrieli and Lehrer (2005).
The first characterization of the class of exact games is the condition of
exact balancedness. One interpretation of balancedness is that the players
can distribute one unit of working time to any coalition and in doing so
cannot generate more value than the grand coalition. The condition of exact
balancedness is identical to the one of balancedness, except that one coalition
is allowed to exist for a negative amount of time, which would allow its players
to spend more than one unit of time in the other coalitions. We show that
exact balancedness implies total balancedness.
The second characterization spells out what more than total balancedness
is needed to obtain exactness. It says that a game is exact if an only if it is
totally balanced and overbalanced. In case of overbalancedness, no weight is
put on the grand coalition and one coalition exists for a non-positive amount
of time, which requires the players to spend at least one unit of time in the
other coalitions. From this characterization it follows immediately that an
exact game is totally balanced.
The simplicity of our balancedness conditions is helpful in applications.
Cso´ka, Herings, and Ko´czy (2007) use total balancedness and overbalanced-
ness to show that risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty are
exact. Biswas, Parthasarathy, Potters, and Voorneveld (1999) show that
totally exact games are convex (and that convex games are totally exact).
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Using exact balancedness we provide an alternative proof of this result.
We also study games that are convex for the grand coalition, where con-
vexity is only required for coalitions whose union is the set of all players. We
show that exact balancedness implies that a game is convex for the grand
coalition, which leads to the result that exact games of less than four players
are convex. Using the intuition behind exact balancedness, we provide an
example of a game which is both totally balanced and convex for the grand
coalition, but which is not exact.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start with the notation and
the necessary definitions. In Section 3 we study the balancedness conditions
for exact games. In Section 4 we demonstrate the usefulness of our character-
izations of exact games. We conclude the paper with a summary of how the
classes of balanced, totally balanced, convex for the grand coalition, exact,
totally exact, and convex games are related to one another.
2 Notation and Definitions
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote a finite set of players, N is the collection of
non-empty subsets of N, and D is the collection of non-empty subsets of a
coalition D ∈ N . A value function v : 2N → R satisfying that v(∅) = 0
gives rise to a cooperative game with transferable utility (game, for short)
(N, v). Let Γ denote the set of games with n players. An allocation is a
vector x ∈ Rn, where xi is the payoff of player i ∈ N . For a coalition C ∈ N ,
let x(C) =
∑
i∈C xi. An allocation x ∈ R
n is called efficient if x(N) = v(N),
individually rational if xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N, and coalitionally rational if
x(C) ≥ v(C) for all C ∈ N . The core is the set of efficient and coalitionally
rational allocations.
For each C ∈ N , a(C) ∈ Rn is the membership vector in C, where
ai(C) = 1 if i ∈ C and ai(C) = 0 otherwise.
Definition 2.1. A balanced vector of weights is (λC)C∈N such that λC ∈ R+
and
∑
C∈N λCa(C) = a(N). A game (N, v) is balanced if
∑
C∈N λCv(C) ≤
v(N) for all balanced vectors of weights (λC)C∈N .
Let Γb denote the class of balanced games with n players. A well-known
interpretation of balancedness is that if the players distribute one unit of
working time to any coalition and each coalition is active during λC time
units, then the players cannot generate more value than v(N), the value of
the grand coalition. Balancedness is a necessary and sufficient condition for
the core in a transferable utility game to be non-empty (Bondareva, 1963;
Shapley, 1967); Predtetchinski and Herings (2004) provide the corresponding
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necessary and sufficient balancedness conditions for non-transferable utility
games.
For a game (N, v) and a coalition C ∈ N the subgame (C, vC) is obtained
by restricting v to subsets of C.
Definition 2.2. A game (N, v) is totally balanced if for every D ∈ N its
subgame (D, vD) is balanced, that is, if for all D ∈ N and for all vec-
tors (λC)C∈D such that λC ∈ R+ and
∑
C∈D λCa(C) = a(D), we have∑
C∈D λCv(C) ≤ v(D).
In a totally balanced game every subgame has a non-empty core. Let Γtb
denote the class of totally balanced games with n players.
Schmeidler (1972) introduces exact games.
Definition 2.3. A game (N, v) is exact if for each C ∈ 2N there exists a
core allocation x such that x(C) = v(C).
Let Γe denote the class of exact games with n players.
Definition 2.4. A game (N, v) is convex if for all S, T ∈ 2N we have v(S)+
v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ).
Let Γc denote the class of convex games with n players. Convex games
are exact (Schmeidler, 1972). We now introduce the new notion of convexity
for the grand coalition.
Definition 2.5. A game (N, v) is convex for the grand coalition if for all
S, T ∈ 2N such that S ∪ T = N we have v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(N) + v(S ∩ T ).
Let Γcg denote the set of games which are convex for the grand coalition.
Following Biswas, Parthasarathy, Potters, and Voorneveld (1999), we define
totally exact games analogously to totally balanced games.
Definition 2.6. A game (N, v) is totally exact if for every D ∈ N its sub-
game (D, vD) is exact.
Let Γte denote the class of totally exact games with n players.
3 Exact Games and Balancedness
Consider a game (N, v) ∈ Γ. For each coalition D ∈ N we develop a linear
programming problem related to the game (N, v). The linear program is such
that whenever (N, v) is exact any optimal solution x∗ is a core allocation
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satisfying x∗(D) = v(D). We denote the linear program by Pv,D and its dual
by Dv,D.
min a(N)x max
∑
C∈N λCv(C)
s. t. s. t.
(Pv,D) a(C)x ≥ v(C), C ∈ N \ {D} (Dv,D)
∑
C∈N λCa(C) = a(N)
a(D)x = v(D) λC ∈ R+, C ∈ N \ {D}
x ∈ Rn λD ∈ R.
Let us discuss the primal. The first part of the feasibility constraints
requires that x is coalitionally rational for all coalitions but coalition D. The
second part of the feasibility constraints requires that x(D) = v(D), that is,
x should be efficient in the subgame (D, vD), so a feasible solution yields a
core element in the subgame (D, vD).
If (D, vD) is a balanced game, then the set of feasible solutions is non-
empty, since we have a core element in the subgame (D, vD) and the other
elements of a feasible solution can be chosen sufficiently large. In this case
the set of optimal solutions of (Pv,D) is also non-empty since the set of fea-
sible solutions is bounded from below. If (D, vD) is not balanced, then the
set of feasible solutions of (Pv,D) is empty, since then (D, v
D) has no core
allocations. If x∗ is an optimal solution of the primal, then ov,D = a(N)x
∗
is the value of the optimal solution, which by the duality theorem of linear
programming is the same as the optimal objective value of the dual. If (Pv,D)
has no optimal solutions, then we define ov,D =∞. The linear programming
problems are related to exactness as follows.
Proposition 3.1. A game (N, v) ∈ Γ is exact if and only if for every D ∈ N
we have that ov,D = v(N).
Proof.
(⇒) The proof is by contradiction. Take any exact game (N, v) ∈ Γe
and assume that there is a coalition D ∈ N such that ov,D 6= v(N). Let
x∗ be an optimal solution of (Pv,D). Using the feasibility constraints of the
primal we have that A(N)x∗ > v(N). As (N, v) is exact there exists a core
element x such that x(D) = v(D) and x(N) = v(N). The vector x satisfies
the feasibility constraints and has objective value A(N)x = v(N) < A(N)x∗,
a contradiction.
(⇐) Assume that for each D ∈ N the value of the optimal solution is
v(N). Let x∗ be an optimal solution of (Pv,D), so A(N)x
∗ = v(N), that is x∗
is efficient. The efficiency and the feasibility constraints imply that x∗ is a
core allocation of (N, v) with x(D) = v(D). Thus (N, v) is exact. 2
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Let us continue by analyzing the dual, (Dv,D). It follows from optimality
that ov,D = v(N) if and only if for all feasible solutions of (Dv,D) the value
of the objective function is not larger than v(N). Using this observation,
Proposition 3.1, and the linear programming problems we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 3.2. A game (N, v) ∈ Γ is exact if and only if for every D ∈ N
and for each vector (λC)C∈N such that for C ∈ N \ {D}, λC ∈ R+, λD ∈ R,
and
∑
C∈N λCa(C) = a(N) we have
∑
C∈N λCv(C) ≤ v(N).
In Theorem 3.4 below, we rewrite the conditions in Corollary 3.2 using
exact balancedness, defined as follows.
Definition 3.3. An exactly balanced vector of weights is a vector (λC)C∈N
such that for someD ∈ N , λD ∈ R, for C 6= D, λC ∈ R+, and
∑
C∈N λCa(C) =
a(N). A game (N, v) is exactly balanced if
∑
C∈N λCv(C) ≤ v(N) for all ex-
actly balanced vectors of weights.
Notice that the only difference to the condition of balancedness is that one
weight, λD can be arbitrary (negative, zero, or positive). Exact balancedness
is a necessary and sufficient condition for a game to be exact, as the following
theorem claims.
Theorem 3.4. A game (N, v) ∈ Γ is exact if and only if it is exactly balanced.
Proof. This follows immediately from Corollary 3.2. 2
Exact games can also be characterized by total balancedness and over-
balancedness, to be defined next.
Definition 3.5. An overbalanced vector of weights is a vector (µC)C∈2N\{∅,N}
such that µC ∈ R+ and
∑
C∈N\{D,N} µCa(C) = a(N)+µDa(D) for some D ∈
N . A game (N, v) is overbalanced if
∑
C∈N\{D,N} µCv(C) ≤ v(N) + µDv(D)
for all overbalanced vectors of weights.
The difference between balancedness and overbalancedness is that in the
case of overbalancedness, no weight is put on the grand coalition and one
coalition is forced to exist for a non-positive amount of time (−µD ≤ 0),
which requires players to spend at least one unit of time in the other coali-
tions.
Theorem 3.6. A game (N, v) ∈ Γ is exact if and only if it is totally balanced
and overbalanced.
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Proof. We show that a game (N, v) ∈ Γ is totally balanced and overbalanced
if and only if it is exactly balanced.
(⇐) For D ∈ N \{N} balancedness of (D, vD) is obtained by setting the
exactly balanced weights such that λN = 1 and λD = −1. Balancedness of
(N, v) is obtained by considering exactly balanced vectors of weights where
all the weights are non-negative. Using exactly balanced vectors of weights
with λN = 0 and λD ≤ 0 implies overbalancedness of (N, v).
(⇒) Take any exactly balanced vector of weights (λC)C∈N with λD ∈ R,
λC ∈ R+ for C ∈ N \ {D}, and
∑
C∈N
λCa(C) = a(N). (1)
It follows immediately that λN ≤ 1. We discuss two cases depending on the
value of λN .
1. λN < 1. In this case (1) can be rearranged as
∑
C∈N\{N}
λC
1− λN
a(C) = a(N). (2)
If λD ≤ 0, then exact balancedness is implied by overbalancedness of
(N, v), otherwise by balancedness of (N, v).
2. λN = 1. If λD ≥ 0, then exact balancedness is trivially satisfied since
(1) implies (λC)C∈N\{N} = 0. If λD < 0, then (1) can be rearranged as
∑
C∈N\{D,N}
λC
−λD
a(C) = a(D), (3)
and exact balancedness follows from total balancedness of (N, v).
2
Theorem 3.6 characterizes exact games as being the only totally balanced
and overbalanced games. It follows immediately that an exact game is totally
balanced, which was also shown by Schmeidler (1972). The result shows that
exact games constitute the subset of totally balanced games that satisfies the
extra condition of overbalancedness, where one weight should be non-positive
when checking the “normal” balancedness of the game.
Schmeidler (1972) characterizes exact games as follows (see also Derks
and Reijnierse (1998), Theorem 7).
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Theorem 3.7. A game (N, v) ∈ Γ is exact if and only if for every D ∈ N \
{N}, for each vector (γC)C∈N such that γC ∈ R+ and
∑
C∈N\{N} γCa(C) =
a(D) + γNa(N) we have
∑
C∈N\{N} γCv(C) ≤ v(D) + γNv(N).
We provide a direct proof of the equivalence of Schmeidler’s characteri-
zation of exactness and the characterization in Theorem 3.6.
Proposition 3.8. A game (N, v) ∈ Γ satisfies the conditions in Theorem
3.7 if and only if it is totally balanced and overbalanced.
Proof.
(⇒) That (D, vD) is balanced for D ∈ N \{N} follows by setting γN = 0.
Balancedness of (N, v) follows from weights such that γN = 1 and γD ≥ 1.
Overbalanced weights satisfy the equality
∑
C∈N\{D,N}
µCa(C) = a(N) + µDa(D). (4)
The case where µD = 0 follows from Schmeidler’s characterization with γN =
1 and γD = 1. In case µD > 0, (4) is equivalent to
∑
C∈N\{D,N}
µC
µD
a(C) =
1
µD
a(N) + a(D).
It is now easily seen that this case is implied by Schmeidler’s characterization
when we choose γD = 0, γN = 1/µD, and γC = µC/µD for C ∈ N \ {D,N}.
(⇐) The balancing weights of Schmeidler satisfy
∑
C∈N\{N}
γCa(C) = a(D) + γNa(N). (5)
In this case Schmeidler’s condition is
∑
C∈N\{N} γCv(C) ≤ v(D) + γNv(N).
If γN = 0, then balancedness of (D, v
D) gives rise to Schmeidler’s condition.
If γN > 0 and γD ≥ 1, then (5) is equivalent to
∑
C∈N\{D,N}
γC
γN
a(C) +
γD − 1
γN
a(D) = a(N),
and Schmeidler’s condition follows from balancedness. If γN > 0 and γD < 1,
then (5) is equivalent to
∑
C∈N\{D,N}
γC
γN
a(C) = a(N) +
1− γD
γN
a(D),
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so Schmeidler’s condition follows from overbalancedness. 2
For a coalition C ∈ N let |C| denote the number of players involved
in the coalition. Azrieli and Lehrer (2005) give the following necessary and
sufficient conditions for exactness.
Theorem 3.9. (Azrieli and Lehrer, 2005, Proposition 2) A game (N, v) ∈ Γ
is exact if and only if for every D ∈ N , for each vector (αC)C∈N such that
αC ∈ R+,
∑
C∈N αC = 1, β ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
C∈N αC
a(C)
|C|
= β a(D)
|D|
+ (1− β)a(N)
|N |
we have
∑
C∈N αC
v(C)
|C| ≤ β
v(D)
|D| + (1− β)
v(N)
|N | .
Notice that in Theorem 3.9 if D = N , we have the usual balancedness
condition expressed in terms of average worth, that is when distributing one
unit of working time to any coalition, players cannot generate more value per
person than in the grand coalition.
In a similar way as in the proof of Proposition 3.8, one can show that the
characterization by Azrieli and Lehrer (2005) is equivalent to the character-
ization by total balancedness and overbalancedness.
Of all the characterizations presented, exact balancedness is closest to
balancedness. In fact, the only difference is that in exact balancedness one of
the balancing weights can be chosen to be negative. The characterization of
exact games as the ones that satisfy total balancedness and overbalancedness
spells out what more than total balancedness is needed to obtain exactness.
Our characterizations of exact games differ from the ones by Schmeidler
(1972) and by Azrieli and Lehrer (2005) in that a weight of one is put on
a(N). This way we can employ the usual interpretation of balancedness,
where players allocate one unit of time over the various coalitions, and in
doing so cannot generate more value than the grand coalition.
4 Applications of Exact Balancedness
Cso´ka, Herings, and Ko´czy (2007) use the characterization of exact games
as those that are totally balanced and overbalanced to show that risk allo-
cation games with no aggregate uncertainty are exact. In this section we
show a number of applications of the condition of exact balancedness (Defi-
nition 3.3). First we demonstrate that exact games are convex for the grand
coalition (Definition 2.5) and the class of totally exact games (Definition 2.6)
coincides with the class of convex games (Definition 2.4). Then we discuss
games with less than four players, where exact games turn out to be convex.
Finally, we present an example of a game with four players that is totally
balanced, convex for the grand coalition, but not exact.
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Proposition 4.1. If the game (N, v) is exact, then it is convex for the grand
coalition, Γe ⊆ Γcg.
Proof. Take two coalitions S, T ∈ 2N such that S ∪T = N . Let D = S ∩T .
Since (N, v) is exact, by Theorem 3.4 it is exactly balanced. We define and
exactly balanced vector of weights by setting λS = 1, λT = 1, and λD = −1.
All other balancing weights are set to zero. Notice that this constitutes
and exactly balanced vector of weights, since a(S) + a(T ) − a(D) = a(N).
By exact balancedness we have that v(S) + v(T ) − v(D) ≤ v(N), that is
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(N) + v(S ∩ T ). 2
Theorem 4.2. A game is totally exact if and only if it is convex, Γte = Γc.
Proof.
(⇒) Since by Proposition 4.1 exact games are convex for the grand coali-
tion, totally exact games are convex for all coalitions, that is they are convex.
(⇐) It is known that convex games are exact (Schmeidler, 1972). Since
a subgame of a convex game is also convex, we have total exactness. 2
The following result claims that a game with less than four players that
is totally balanced and convex for the grand coalition has to be convex.
Proposition 4.3. Assume that there are less than four players. If the game
(N, v) is totally balanced and convex for the grand coalition, then it is convex.
Proof. For one or two player games the claim requires no proof. Consider
the case with three players. For coalitions S, T ∈ 2N such that S∪T = N con-
vexity follows from the convexity for the grand coalition. When S∩T = {∅},
S ∪ T = C, where C is a two-player coalition, convexity follows from total
balancedness. When S ⊆ T , where T is a two-player coalition, convexity
follows since S ∩ T = S and S ∪ T = T . 2
Exact games are totally balanced (Theorem 3.6) and convex for the grand
coalition (Proposition 4.1): Γe ⊆ Γtb ∩ Γcg. Since a convex game is exact,
using Proposition 4.3 we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4. Assume that there are less than four players. Then a game
is exact if and only if it is convex.
There exist games that are convex for the grand coalition, but that are
not totally balanced, and games that are totally balanced, but not convex
for the grand coalition, so Γtb ∩ Γcg ( Γtb and Γtb ∩ Γcg ( Γcg. Theorem 3.6
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and Proposition 4.1 imply that Γe ⊆ Γtb∩Γcg.We consider next the question
whether there are games that are totally balanced and convex for the grand
coalition, but not exact. Using the intuition behind exact balancedness we
provide an example of such a game, thus we have that Γe ( Γtb ∩ Γcg.
Example 4.5. We present a game that is totally balanced and convex for
the grand coalition, but not exact. By Proposition 4.3 we need at least four
players. Consider the following game with four players. Let
v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = v({4}) = 0,
v({1, 2}) = v({1, 3}) = v({1, 4}) = 1,
v({2, 3}) = v({2, 4}) = v({3, 4}) = 0,
v({1, 2, 3}) = v({1, 2, 4}) = v({1, 3, 4}) = 1,
v({2, 3, 4}) = 0,
v({1, 2, 3, 4}) = 2.
The game (N, v) is totally balanced, since every subgame (C, vC) where
C contains player 1 has a core element where player 1 receives v(C) and
the other players nothing, and the zero vector is a core element of all other
subgames. The game (N, v) is convex for the grand coalition as v(N) = 2
weakly exceeds the sum of the value of any other two coalitions. We show
that the game (N, v) is not exactly balanced. Let D = ({1}) and consider the
weights λ{1,2} = λ{1,3} = λ{1,4} = 1, λ{1} = −2, and set all other weights equal
to zero. These weights constitute and exactly balanced vector of weights,
since a({1, 2}) + a({1, 3}) + a({1, 4}) − 2a({1}) = a({1, 2, 3, 4}). However,
v({1, 2}) + v({1, 3}) + v({1, 4})− 2v({1}) = 3 > 2 = v({1, 2, 3, 4}), thus v is
not exact.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided two new characterizations of exact games us-
ing linear programming formulations. The first characterization of exactness
is by exact balancedness. The condition of exact balancedness is identical to
the one of balancedness, except that exactly one of the weights is allowed to
be negative. Using the usual interpretation of balancedness, this is equiva-
lent to saying that players are allowed to spend a negative amount of time
in a particular coalition, which enables them to spend more than one unit of
time in the other coalitions.
The second one says that a game is exact if an only if it is totally balanced
and overbalanced. The condition of overbalancedness requires one coalition
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to exist for a non-positive amount of time, which requires players to spend
at least one unit of time in the other coalitions.
By applying exact balancedness we have shown that the class of totally
exact games (Γte) coincides with the class of convex games (Γc). We have
also proven that with less than four players the class of exact games coincides
with the class of convex games.
Our characterization of exact games by total balancedness and overbal-
ancedness implies that an exact game is totally balanced (Γtb), and we have
shown that exact balancedness implies that an exact game is convex for the
grand coalition (Γcg). Finally, we have provided an example of a game that
is totally balanced and convex for the grand coalition, but not exact. The re-
lationships between the various classes of games are summarized in Figure 1.
Γte = Γc
Γe
Γtb ∩ Γcg
Γtb
Γb
Figure 1: Subsets of balanced games.
References
Azrieli, Y., Lehrer, E., 2005. Concavification and convex games. Working
Paper.
Biswas, A. K., Parthasarathy, T., Potters, J. A. M., Voorneveld, M., 1999.
Large cores and exactness. Games and Economic Behavior 28, 1–12.
12
Bondareva, Olga N., 1963. Some applications of linear programming methods
to the theory of cooperative games (in Russian). Problemy Kybernetiki 10,
119–139.
Cso´ka, P., Herings, P. J. J., Ko´czy, L. A´., 2007. Stable allocations of risk.
METEOR Research Memorandum RM07/041, 1–19.
Derks, J., Reijnierse, H., 1998. On the core of a collection of coalitions.
International Journal of Game Theory 27, 451–459.
Dubey, P., Shapley, L. S., 1984. Totally balanced games arising from con-
trolled programming problems. Mathematical Programming 29, 245–267.
Kalai, E., Zemel, E., 1982a. Generalized network problems yielding totally
balanced games. Operations Research 30, 998–1008.
Kalai, E., Zemel, E., 1982b. Totally balanced games and games of flow.
Mathematics of Operations Research 7, 476–478.
Legut, J., 1990. On totally balanced games arising from cooperation in fair
division. Games and Economic Behavior 2, 47–60.
Owen, G., 1975. On the core of linear production games. Mathematical Pro-
gramming 9, 358–370.
Predtetchinski, A., Herings, P. J. J., 2004. A necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for the non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game.
Journal of Economic Theory 116, 84–92.
Schmeidler, D., 1972. Cores of exact games. Journal of Mathematical Anal-
ysis and Applications 40, 214–225.
Shapley, L. S., 1967. On balanced sets and cores. Naval Research Logistics
Quarterly 14, 453–460.
Shapley, L. S., Shubik, M., 1969. On market games. Journal of Economic
Theory 1, 9–25.
Tijs, S., Parthasarathy, T., Potters, J., Prassad, V. Rajendra, 1984. Permu-
tation games: Another class of totally balanced games. OR Spektrum 6,
119–123.
13
